A form fails after a WAF change
Dated legitimate requests help identify a blocking rule and action in logs. A 403 may also come from the application or another proxy; the HTTP status alone is not proof.
A form, payment or API returns 403 to legitimate users. Disabling a rule may restore access but also allow malicious requests.
Find the blocked request, distinguish WAF from application behavior and present the smallest justified change to security owners.
Dated legitimate requests help identify a blocking rule and action in logs. A 403 may also come from the application or another proxy; the HTTP status alone is not proof.
An API field or encoded parameter triggers a false positive. Compare a request fix with an exclusion limited to that field or path instead of disabling a rule for everyone.
Some clients succeed while others fail depending on payload or route. Reproducible, redacted samples bound the diagnosis; events without reliable correlation remain explicitly unresolved.
I agree the journeys, timeframe, policy and legitimate samples with you. I confirm which logs and correlation IDs are available before looking for a rule.
I connect each sample with the response, WAF action and matching rule; I distinguish proven blocks from hypotheses and application errors.
I compare an application correction and a narrow exclusion, state residual risk and plan legitimate-journey and security checks. I submit the change to its owner for approval before execution.
Prerequisites. Affected journeys and Front Door or Application Gateway WAF policy, dates and IDs of sample requests, read access to events and a security contact. Secrets and personal data are redacted before sharing.
Diagnosis boundaries. Only agreed controls and requests are examined. Policy changes, production tests and monitoring after a change need approved remediation with a rollback plan.
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